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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 17, 2018, the tip of the data protection iceberg became public
when news broke that Cambridge Analytica harvested the personally identifiable
information (“PII”) of 50 million Facebook users without consent. 1 The world
learned that Cambridge Analytica, a political consulting firm, 2 had obtained PII
from up to 87 million Facebook users. 3 Many of these users had not consented to
the consulting firm accessing their PII. 4 Facebook, a business that collects its
users’ PII and generates personalized advertisements based on that data, 5
conceded that Cambridge Analytica had improperly accessed many Facebook
users’ information. 6
Cambridge Analytica conducted a survey within Facebook and accessed PII
from both consenting and non-consenting users.7 Approximately 270,000
consenting users voluntarily took Cambridge Analytica’s survey, downloaded a
computer application (“app”), and gave Cambridge Analytica permission to
collect their PII through the app. 8 Unfortunately, the app also accessed

1. Sam Meredith, Facebook-Cambridge Analytica: A Timeline of the Data Hijacking Scandal, CNBC
(Apr. 10, 2018, 9:21 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/10/facebook-cambridge-analytica-a-timeline-of-thedata-hijacking-scandal.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. About Us, CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA, https://ca-political.com/ca-advantage (last visited May 23, 2018)
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
3. Natasha Singer, What You Don’t Know About How Facebook Uses Your Data, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/technology/facebook-privacy-hearings.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
4. Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Confessore & Carole Cadwalladr, How Trump Consultants Exploited
the Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/u
s/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html [hereinafter Rosenberg, Confessore & Cadwalladr] (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
5. All Things Considered: What Facebook is Changing About its Data-Sharing Practices, NPR (Apr. 5,
2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/05/599895248/what-facebook-is-changing-about-its-data-sharing-practices
[hereinafter All Things Considered: What Facebook is Changing About its Data-Sharing Practices] (on file
with
The
University
of
the
Pacific
Law
Review);
Data
Policy,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/full_data_use_policy (last updated Apr. 19, 2018) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
6. All Things Considered: What Facebook is Changing About its Data-Sharing Practices, supra note 5.
7. Rosenberg, Confessore & Cadwalladr, supra note 4.
8. Id.
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information from individuals connected to those consenting users. 9 At the time of
the breach, Facebook permitted businesses to access non-consenting users’
information.10 Non-consenting users did not take the survey, download the app,
or give Cambridge Analytica permission to access their PII. 11 In short,
Cambridge Analytica failed to obtain consent from a vast majority of the
Facebook users whose PII it accessed.12
Marc Levine, Assemblymember for California’s Tenth District, 13 proposed
AB 2182 to “catch up with [technology]” and eliminate ways that businesses
misuse and abuse Californians’ PII. 14 He wanted to hold “Big Tech” accountable
by creating a regulatory body to ensure privacy regulations evolve with the
inevitable advancements in data collection. 15 Pressured by the Big Tech lobby,
both the Assembly and the Senate revised AB 2182 and removed its ability to
create regulations.16 As modified, AB 2182 will not generate new data protection
regulations and will do nothing to further protect Californians’ privacy. 17
While Big Tech lobbyists dismembered AB 2182, a real estate developer
from San Francisco qualified a ballot measure for the November election. 18 Years
of planning, research, and hard work from Alastair Mactaggart and Rick Arney
culminated in the creation of Chapter 55. 19 Mactaggart and Arney are the
embodiment of former President Obama’s 2013 challenge: “[If] you don’t like a
particular policy . . . Then argue for your position. Go out there and win an
election. Push to change it.”20 The pair submitted nearly double the amount of
signatures required to qualify a ballot measure, 21 leveraged their measure to force
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Marc Levine, California Must Regulate How Big Tech Uses Our Data, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 23, 2018),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/California-must-regulate-how-Big-Tech-uses-our12777734.php (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
14. Telephone Interview with Marc Levine, Assemblymember, Cal. Assembly (June 20, 2018) (notes on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
15. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY & CONSUMER PROTECTION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2182, at 2 (May 25, 2018); see also Will Oremus, Big Tobacco. Big Pharma. Big Tech?, SLATE (Nov. 17,
2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2017/11/how_silicon_valley_became_big_tech.h
tml (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining “Big Tech” as “Google, Facebook,
Amazon, Microsoft, and Apple”).
16. AB 2182, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as amended on May 25, 2018, but not enacted).
17. Telephone Interview with Marc Levine, supra note 14.
18. Levi Sumagaysay, Privacy in California: Ballot Measure Qualifies, Bill Advances, MERCURY NEWS
(June 26, 2018, 5:15 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/06/26/privacy-in-california-ballot-measurequalifies-bill-advances/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
19. About Us, CAL. CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT, https://www.caprivacy.org/about-us (last visited Aug. 9,
2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
20. Chris Cillizza, President Obama to Republicans: I won. Deal with it, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/10/17/president-obama-to-republicans-i-won-dealwith-it/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
21. About Us, CAL. CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT, supra note 19.
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legislators to act, and defeated the tech lobby with the passage of Chapter 55. 22 In
a world where money and lobbying have immense influence over legislative
decisions, Mactaggart and Arney provided a blueprint for Californians to
overcome wealthy lobbies and enact common-sense privacy legislation. 23
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Historically, legislation has lagged behind technological developments. 24 For
example, the United States Patent and Trademark Office granted Alexander
Graham Bell a patent for the telephone on March 7, 1876. 25 It was not until 1994
that Congress passed the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse
Prevention Act, which focused on protecting consumers from “telemarketing
deception and abuse.” 26 Today, technology is developing exponentially faster
than before,27 and the telephone/telemarketer paradigm resurfaced with PII and
Big Tech.28 States are beginning to realize that Big Tech collects information
from individuals that are on and offline. 29
Although the Supreme Court discussed the right to privacy, and other
countries enacted legislation to protect their citizens’ privacy, this right never
materialized anywhere in the United States. 30 Section A of this part presents the

22. Ben Adler, California Passes Strict Internet Privacy Law with Implications for the Country, NPR
(June 29, 2018, 5:05 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624336039/california-passes-strict-internet-privacylaw-with-implications-for-the-country (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
23. See id. (conquering “a trillion-dollar goliath” with $3.5 million).
24. Vivek Wadhwa, Laws and Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 15,
2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526401/laws-and-ethics-cant-keep-pace-with-technology/ (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
25. U.S. Patent No. 117,465 (filed Feb. 14, 1876).
26. 15 U.S.C.A. § 6101 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231).
27. Wadhwa, supra note 24.
28. See Will Oremus, Big Tobacco. Big Pharma. Big Tech?, SLATE (Nov. 17, 2017), http://www.slate.co
m/articles/technology/technology/2017/11/how_silicon_valley_became_big_tech.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (pointing to Big Tech’s agenda of self-regulation and moving slowly
toward achieving that goal); see also Jason Morris & Ed Lavandera, Why Big Companies Buy, Sell Your Data,
CNN (Aug. 23, 2012), https://www.cnn.com/2012/08/23/tech/web/big-data-acxiom/index.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (indicating that cyberspace is outpacing legislation).
29. Telephone Interview with Marc Levine, supra note 14.
30. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 6801 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231) (pertaining only to financial
institutions); see also 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231) (defining records as
“information about an individual maintained by a [government] agency”); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 415
(1967) (“Privacy, then, is a basic right.”); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (“[T]he First
Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 656 (1961) (“The right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved
to the people, would stand in marked contrast to all other rights declared as ‘basic to a free society.’”); see
generally Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119/1) 1
[hereinafter GDPR] (regulating PII in the EU).
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federal government’s lack of privacy regulations. 31 Section B discusses the
European Union’s (“EU”) recent privacy regulation.32 Section C reflects upon
California’s early attempts at privacy regulations. 33 Section D explores
California’s current privacy regulations. 34
A. The Federal Government and Data Protection
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution lists the powers delegated to
Congress,35 and the Tenth Amendment limits those powers by reserving nondelegated powers to the states. 36 In short, the Framers empowered the states to
regulate areas where no law existed. 37 The United States Constitution makes no
mention of privacy, and the Supreme Court has offered minimal guidance on the
subject.38 In the 1960s, the Supreme Court declared that “the right of privacy is a
fundamental personal right,” 39 and yet the federal government has remained
virtually silent when it comes to protecting the privacy of United States citizens
on the Internet.40
The Supreme Court recognized a right to privacy on three separate
occasions.41 First, in 1961, the Court stated that “the right to privacy . . . [is] no
less important than any other right” and it is “basic to a free society.” 42 Then, in
1965, the Supreme Court cited the Ninth Amendment to justify the right to
privacy.43 The Ninth Amendment states, the rights enumerated in “the
Constitution . . . shall not be construed to deny . . . [other rights] retained by the
people.” 44 Finally, in 1967, the right to privacy reemerged in a dissent where
Justice Fortas asserted that “Privacy . . . is a basic right” and “the states may . . .
enact laws to vindicate that right.” 45
The legislature responded to the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement of the

31. Infra Part II.A.
32. Infra Part II.B.
33. Infra Part II.C.
34. Infra Part II.D.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
37. See id. (reserving undelegated powers to the states).
38. See generally U.S. CONST. (making no mention of the word “privacy”); see also Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374, 415 (1967) (“Privacy, then, is a basic right.”).
39. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965).
40. See Protecting Consumers Privacy, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/mediaresources/protecting-consumer-privacy (last visited June 23, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (regulating financial and children’s privacy but not individual privacy).
41. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 415; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
42. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656.
43. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 490.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
45. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 415.
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right to privacy by passing a series of privacy laws between 1970 and 1999. 46
Congress enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) in 1970, which
focused on consumer privacy in credit reporting agencies.47 Congress expanded
privacy regulations by passing the Privacy Act of 1974, which only applies to
government records.48 Then, in 1999, Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, which codified a list of mandatory privacy rules for financial institutions. 49
Though all three pieces of legislation implemented privacy protections, no
modern regulations protect privacy from commercial abuses on the Internet. 50
B. The European Union and Data Protection
The Facebook/Cambridge Analytica data breach alerted the public to
commercial abuses of PII and the need for an official right to privacy on the
Internet.51 Both companies have since come under heavy international scrutiny. 52
Prior to the breach, the EU was well aware of the need to regulate information
privacy.53 In fact, the EU had already affirmed its citizens’ right to Internet
privacy in court and adopted legislation to protect its citizens from commercial
data abuses.54
The Council of Europe signed the European Convention on Human Rights
(“ECHR”) in 1950.55 The ECHR is an international treaty that proclaims essential
human rights and freedoms, 56 many of which run parallel to the United States’
Bill of Rights.57 For example, Section 1 of the ECHR guarantees citizens the

46. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231); 15 U.S.C.A. § 6801 (Westlaw
through Pub. L. No. 115-231); 15 U.S.C.A. § 6101 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231); 5 U.S.C.A. §
552(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231).
47. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681.
48. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551–552(a).
49. 15 U.S.C.A. § 6801.
50. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681; 15 U.S.C.A. § 6801; 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551–552(a).
51. Meredith, supra note 1.
52. Matthew Rosenberg & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook’s Role in Data Misuse Sets Off Storms on Two
Continents, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/us/cambridge-analyticafacebook-privacy-data.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
53. See GDPR, supra note 30, at 1 (drafting the GDPR two years before the Facebook/Cambridge
Analytica data breach); see also Seung Lee, California Legislator Introduces Bill to Regulate How Silicon
Valley Uses Your Data, MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 13, 2018, 4:41 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/02/12
/182uropa182nia-assemblymember-introduces-bill-to-regulate-silicon-valleys-data/ (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review) (proposing the privacy legislation one day before the news article was published).
54. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario
Costeja González, 2014 E.C.R. I-317; Make Me Smart: It’s a GDParty, MINN. PUB. RADIO (May 24, 2018),
https://www.marketplace.org/2018/05/24/tech/make-me-smart-kai-and-molly/66-its-gdparty (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
55. European Convention on Human Rights, June 1, 2010, C.E.T.S. No. 194, art. 8 [hereinafter ECHR].
56. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (326/391), pmbl.
[hereinafter ECFR].
57. Compare ECHR, supra note 55, at arts. 6, 9–11 (declaring freedoms of expression, religion, press,
assembly, and the right to a fair trial), with U.S. CONST. amends. I, VI (guaranteeing freedoms of speech,
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right to a fair trial, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and freedom of
assembly.58 Further, the ECHR guarantees many rights that have emerged in the
United States since the ratification of the Bill of Rights, including the right to
marry, and prohibitions on slavery and discrimination.59
In 2007, the EU ratified the Treaty of Lisbon, which amended and enacted
the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (“ECFR”).60 The ECFR, not to be
confused with the ECHR, is the EU’s modern declaration of fundamental rights. 61
Article 7 of the ECFR guarantees the right to respect for a person’s private life. 62
Article 8 of the ECFR states, “everyone has the right to the protection of personal
data concerning him or her” and discusses topics such as consent and data use. 63
In a 2014 case, the EU Court of Justice cited Articles 7 and 8 of the ECFR in
a judgment against Big Tech. 64 The court ruled that an individual may request the
removal of his or her information from an Internet search engine’s search
results.65 In its holding, the court discussed the balance between a legitimate
Internet user’s interest in the PII and the “data subject’s fundamental rights” to
privacy and the protection of his or her personal data. 66
In April 2016, the EU approved the General Data Protection Regulation
(“GDPR”),67 which took effect on May 25, 2018.68 The GDPR gave every citizen
of an EU member state complete control over his or her PII. 69 It also placed many
restrictions on PII, including limitations on what businesses may do with
Europeans’ PII. 70 The GDPR is the most expansive privacy regulation addressing
data protection on the Internet, and experts anticipate that the regulation will
cause a lasting impact in the privacy community. 71

religion, press, assembly, and the right to a fair trial).
58. ECHR, supra note 55, at arts. 6, 9–11.
59. Id. at arts. 4, 12, 14.
60. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.
61. ECFR, supra note 56, at pmbl.
62. Id. at art. 7.
63. Id. at art. 8.
64. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario
Costeja González, 2014 E.C.R. I-317.
65. Id.
66. Court of Justice of the European Union, Judgment in Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González, (2014), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload
/docs/application/pdf/2014-05/cp140070en.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
67. Andrew Rossow, The Birth of GDPR: What Is It and What You Need to Know, FORBES (May 25,
2018, 7:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewrossow/2018/05/25/the-birth-of-gdpr-what-is-it-andwhat-you-need-to-know/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
68. Id.
69. GDPR, supra note 30, at 2–3.
70. Id. at 7.
71. The Future of U.S. Data Privacy After the GDPR, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org
/event/future-us-data-privacy-after-gdpr (last visited Aug. 11, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
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C. California’s Initial Attempts to Regulate Data Protection
California has traditionally been at the forefront of privacy law. 72 In fact,
California is one of only ten states guaranteeing the right to privacy in its
constitution.73 The California Constitution guarantees its citizens “the right to
pursue and obtain privacy,” 74 but recent advances in technology have enabled
Big Tech to encroach upon these rights in new and creative ways. 75 Therefore,
California is looking to regulate data protection once again. 76
In 2010, California created the Office of Privacy Protection (“OPP”) “to
protect the privacy of individuals’ personal information in a manner consistent
with the California Constitution.” 77 The California Legislature tasked the OPP
with making “recommendations to organizations for privacy policies and
practices that promote and protect the interests of [California consumers].”78
However, in early 2011, California Governor Jerry Brown announced a budget
cut that slashed government spending by 12.5 billion dollars in an effort to
increase government efficiency while reducing its cost. 79 Unfortunately, the OPP
was a casualty of those budget cuts, and although it still exists statutorily, it
ceased operations in 2012. 80 After the OPP disbanded, its director transitioned to
the Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) and assumed control of the newly
created Privacy Enforcement and Protection Unit. 81
D. The Scope of the Privacy Enforcement and Protection Unit
The OAG established the Privacy Enforcement and Protection Unit to
“enforce state and federal privacy laws” regulating the “collection . . . of

72. Jan Willem Knibbe, From California with Love, The Latest Privacy Law, RW CONNECT (Aug. 24,
2018), https://rwconnect.esomar.org/from-california-with-love-the-latest-privacy-law/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
73. Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’ L CONF. OF ST. LEGS. (May 5, 2017), http://www.nc
sl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-protections-in-state-constitutions.aspx
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
74. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
75. Jemima Kiss, Does Technology Pose a Threat to Our Private Life?, THE G UARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2010,
7:06 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/aug/21/facebook-places-google (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
76. See AB 2182, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as amended on Mar. 15, 2018, but not
enacted) (proposing regulations that may limit data collection).
77. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 11549.5 (West 2018).
78. Id.
79. Governor Brown’s Budget Slashes State Spending by $12.5 Billion, OFF. OF GOVERNOR EDMUND G.
BROWN JR. (Jan. 10, 2010), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2011/01/10/news16872/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
80. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY & CONSUMER PROTECTION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2182, at 2 (May 25, 2018).
81. Id.
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information by individuals, organizations, and the government.” 82 Data collection
regulations diverge into two distinct categories: one category is applicable to
government agencies, and the other to businesses. 83 Subsection 1 examines the
regulations applicable to government agencies,84 while Subsection 2 explains the
regulations applicable to businesses. 85
1. Data Collection Regulations Applicable to Government Agencies
The California Information Practices Act (“IPA”) acknowledges the
sophistication of technology and privacy risks that result from data collection. 86
The IPA reaffirms Californians’ constitutional right to privacy and indicates that
“the lack of effective laws” threaten that right. 87 Embracing the principle that less
is more, the IPA limits the amount and type of information a government agency
may collect.88 A government entity may only collect information “necessary to
accomplish [its] purpose.”89 Also, the IPA requires state agencies to collect
information directly from individuals, “to the greatest extent practicable,” instead
of collecting it from third parties. 90 When collecting information electronically,
government agencies must provide individuals with various notices. 91 Finally,
agencies must obtain consent prior to sharing an individual’s information with a
third party. 92
2. Data Collection Regulations Applicable to Businesses
The California Online Privacy Protection Act requires the operator of a
commercial website that collects PII to publish its privacy policy in a
conspicuous location on its website. 93 A privacy policy must contain the
information that the business collects and indicate the categories of third parties
that receive the information the business shares. 94 California law also prohibits

82. Id.
83. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.14–1798.22 (West 2018) (regulating how government agencies
may collect PII), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2018) (mandating that businesses publish
privacy policies on their websites), and CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22580 (West 2018) (prohibiting businesses
from marketing products to minors who cannot legally purchase those goods).
84. Infra Part II.D.1.
85. Infra Part II.D.2.
86. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.1 (West 2018).
87. Id.
88. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.14 (West 2018).
89. Id.
90. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.15 (West 2018).
91. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11015.5 (West 2018).
92. Id.
93. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2018).
94. Id.

185

2019 / Business and Professions
specific, targeted marketing on websites designed for minors. 95 These websites
may not market goods or services to minors who cannot legally purchase the
advertised goods or services. 96
Additionally, a website’s privacy policy must disclose how the business
responds to a web browser’s “do not track” (“DNT”) signal. 97 Most major
websites track their visitors’ browsing behaviors, but some web browsers allow
consumers to enable a DNT signal. 98 This signal communicates to websites that
the consumer does not want his or her activity recorded. 99 California law requires
that a commercial website disclose how the business responds to a DNT signal,
but the law does not require the website to comply with the request.100
III. AB 2182 AND CHAPTER 55
Like the EU and its adoption of the GDPR, the California Legislature did not
draft AB 2182 in response to the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica data breach. 101
In fact, the California Assembly had read AB 2182 twice, and amended it once,
before news of Cambridge Analytica’s improprieties became public. 102 Section A
discusses the regulatory body that AB 2182 would have created. 103 Section B
describes the substantial changes that the Assembly made to AB 2182. 104 Section
C briefly analyzes the minor changes that the Senate made to AB 2182 before
Chapter 55 came into existence. 105 Finally, Section D explains various provisions
of Chapter 55—the first Internet privacy law in the United States focused on
protecting individuals’ PII. 106

95. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22580 (West 2018).
96. Id.
97. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575; ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY & CONSUMER PROTECTION,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2182, at 2 (Apr. 17, 2018); CAL. DEP’T. OF JUST., MAKING YOUR PRIVACY
PRACTICES P UBLIC 7 (May 2014), available at https://www.oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cybe
rsecurity/making_your_privacy_practices_public.pdf? (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
98. How Do I Turn On the Do Not Track Feature, FIREFOX, https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/howdo-i-turn-do-not-track-feature (last visited June 23, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
99. Id.
100. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575; ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY & CONSUMER
PROTECTION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2182, at 2 (Apr. 17, 2018); CAL. DEP’T. OF JUST. MAKING YOUR
PRIVACY PRACTICES P UBLIC 7 (2014), available at https://www.oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cybersecu
rity/ making_your_privacy_practices_public.pdf? (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
101. AB 2182, supra note 16.
102. Id.
103. Infra Part III.A.
104. Infra Part III.B.
105. Infra Part III.C.
106. Infra Part III.D.
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A. AB 2182 and the California Data Protection Authority
AB 2182, as proposed by Assemblymember Levine, intended to protect
Californians’ PII by establishing the California Data Protection Authority
(“CDPA”).107 Assemblymember Levine designed the CDPA to propose new
regulations that would evolve with Big Tech’s rapid development. 108 Further, AB
2182 required businesses to delete a customer’s PII when their business
relationship ends.109 Finally, the CDPA would evaluate whether “state and
federal personal information protection laws” were adequate when juxtaposed
with California’s data breach laws. 110 Due to potentially high costs, 111 the
Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection placed AB 2182 on the suspense
file for reevaluation. 112
B. The California Assembly’s Modifications to AB 2182
The Department of Consumer Affairs’ (DCA) mission statement is to
“protect California consumers by providing a safe and fair marketplace through
oversight, enforcement, and licensure of professions.” 113 The Assembly modified
AB 2182, it required the DCA to create a centralized directory where consumers
could access the privacy policies of commercial Internet platforms. 114 This
change reduced the overall cost of the proposed bill, 115 but it also stripped AB
2182 of its ability to generate privacy regulations.116 When AB 2182 moved from
the Assembly to the Senate, legislators refocused the bill to inform consumers
about the existence of privacy policies rather than protect consumer privacy. 117

107. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY & CONSUMER PROTECTION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2182, at 3 (Apr. 17, 2018).
108. Telephone Interview with Marc Levine, supra note 14.
109. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY & CONSUMER PROTECTION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2182, at 1 (Apr. 17, 2018).
110. Id.
111. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY & CONSUMER PROTECTION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2182, at 1 (May 9, 2018).
112. Complete Bill History of AB 2182, http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xht
ml? bill_id=201720180AB2182 (last visited Aug. 12, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
113. CAL. DEP’T. OF CONSUMER AFF., WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE DO 5 (2014), available at
http://www.dca.ca.gov/publications/dca_booklet.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
114. AB 2182, supra note 16.
115. Compare ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY & CONSUMER PROTECTION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS
OF AB 2182, at 1 (May 9, 2018) (projecting significant annual costs as a result of the legislation), with
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY & CONSUMER PROTECTION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2182, at 2
(May 25, 2018) (anticipating minor costs to operate the website).
116. Telephone Interview with Marc Levine, supra note 14.
117. See AB 2182, supra note 16 (containing no regulatory powers but mandating a website for
consumers).
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C. The California Senate’s Modifications to AB 2182
When AB 2182 arrived at the Senate, it contained provisions requiring the
DCA to provide California consumers with a centralized repository of privacy
policies.118 Mirroring the OAG’s 2012 absorption of the DCA’s privacy
enforcement duties, 119 the Senate amended the bill and shifted web portal
operation from the DCA to the OAG. 120 Following the Senate’s amendments to
AB 2182, the OAG would have been responsible for the creation and
maintenance of a web portal containing commercial privacy policies. 121 AB 2182
placed additional responsibilities on the OAG to protect Californians’ PII by
requiring the creation of an Internet web portal containing links to the privacy
policies of online platforms. 122 Further, AB 2182 required online platforms to
inform the OAG of required updates and revisions to the web portal. 123
Despite expanding the OAG’s role with respect to data privacy enforcement,
AB 2182 would not have changed the amount or type of information that
commercial Internet platforms are legally obligated to disclose. 124 Additionally,
AB 2182 classified social media websites as online platforms, making social
media subject to the provisions of this legislation. 125 Before the California
Legislature could approve these changes, the legislature rushed Chapter 55
through the legislative process, which the governor signed it into law. 126 The
legislature had not approved AB 2182 when the Governor signed Chapter 55 into
law; rather, the legislature modified AB 2182 again, causing it to no longer relate
to privacy. 127
D. Chapter 55: The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018
Like AB 2182, Mactaggart and Arney conceptualized the California
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 long before the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica
scandal.128 Chapter 55 guarantees many consumer rights, including the right to

118. Id.
119. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY & CONSUMER PROTECTION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2182, at 2 (May 25, 2018).
120. AB 2182, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as amended on June 18, 2018, but not enacted).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Compare Complete Bill History of AB 2182, supra note 112, with Complete Bill History of AB
375, http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB375 (last visited Aug.
12, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (becoming law after Governor Brown signed
it within seven days of its creation).
127. See Complete Bill History of AB 2182, supra note 112 (as of Aug. 12, 2018, bill was not enacted);
AB 2182, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as amended on Aug. 13, 2018, but not enacted).
128. Compare About Us, CAL. CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT, supra note 19 (initiating the process of
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know what PII a business collects, whether a business sells that information, the
consumer’s right to prohibit that sale, and the freedom from discrimination for
exercising these rights. 129
Beginning on January 1, 2020, California consumers will be able to request
that a business disclose the information it collected about the requestor. 130
Moving forward, a business that collects PII must disclose what information it
collects at or before the collection begins.131 The consumer has the right to
request copies of collected information, free of charge, and request that the
business delete the collected PII. 132 The California Consumer Privacy Act
requires businesses to comply with these requests unless an exception applies. 133
The most notable exception exists when a business must maintain a customer’s
information because of an ongoing relationship. 134
Chapter 55 requires businesses to provide notice to consumers about their
sharing practices and inform consumers of their “right to opt out.” 135 The right to
opt out means that consumers may direct a business to discontinue selling their
PII, and the law prohibits businesses from discriminating against consumers who
opt out.136 Namely, businesses cannot charge higher rates to customers who opt
out, but they can offer financial incentives to encourage customers to opt in to the
selling of their PII. 137 To provide consumers an adequate means of opting out,
businesses must offer consumers at least two ways to opt out of data collection. 138
Businesses must now provide a “clear and conspicuous link” on their website(s),
titled “Do Not Sell My Personal Information,” and they cannot require
consumers to create an account in order to opt out. 139
One final provision of Chapter 55 permits consumers to seek damages
against a business when the consumers’ PII is the subject of a data breach. 140 In
the event that unencrypted or nonredacted PII is the subject of a data breach,
affected consumers can choose to seek damages between $100-$750 “per

drafting privacy legislation in 2015), with Meredith, supra note 1 (breaking news of the Facebook/Cambridge
Analytica scandal in 2018).
129. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100, 1798.120 1798.125 (enacted by Chapter 55).
130. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.198 (enacted by Chapter 55).
131. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (enacted by Chapter 55).
132. Id.
133. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(d)(2)–(9) (enacted by Chapter 55) (exempting businesses from
complying with a request when there are fraudulent activities, problems with their systems, questions of free
speech, compliance issues with the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act, ongoing studies, or
other legal obligations).
134. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(d)(1) (enacted by Chapter 55).
135. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120 (enacted by Chapter 55).
136. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.105, 1798.125 (enacted by Chapter 55).
137. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.125 (enacted by Chapter 55).
138. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.130 (enacted by Chapter 55).
139. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.135 (enacted by Chapter 55).
140. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150 (enacted by Chapter 55).
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customer per incident or actual damages, whichever is greater.” 141 In assessing
damages, the courts may consider factors such as the “seriousness of the
misconduct, the number of violations, . . . and the defendant’s assets, liabilities,
and net worth.”142
IV. ANALYSIS
With over two billion active monthly users,143 Facebook possesses data on
approximately thirty percent of the world’s population. 144 Every day, millions of
Facebook users post information about their lives, and there are no limitations on
what Facebook can do with that information. 145 Facebook’s unfettered access to
PII is an example of the control that a single member of Big Tech has over
information.146 Considering that Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and Apple are also
a part of Big Tech, and that thousands of other companies in the world collect
PII, the volume of unregulated PII is astounding. 147 As a result, the need for
commercial data protection regulations is growing, and the Legislature’s refusal
to regulate commercial data use left Californians vulnerable.148
While some legislators may criticize the EU’s attempt at data regulation as
overly prescriptive, 149 it was a step toward protecting PII in a time when privacy
regulations were uncommon. 150 Despite the fact that the United States shares
many values with the EU, American legislators have remained stagnant while
their European counterpart has been protecting citizens’ privacy from
commercial abuses.151 In the wake of federal complacency, California began
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Company Info, FACEBOOK, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited July 14, 2018) (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
144. World Population Projected to Reach 9.7 Billion by 2050, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/
development/desa/news/population/2015-report.html (last visited July 11, 2018) (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
145. Cara Pring, 100 Social Media Statistics for 2012, THE SOCIAL SKINNY (Jan. 11, 2012),
http://thesocialskinny.com/100-social-media-statistics-for-2012/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
146. Id.
147. Will Oremus, Big Tobacco. Big Pharma. Big Tech?, S LATE (Nov. 17, 2017), http://www.slate.com/
articles/technology/technology/2017/11/how_silicon_valley_became_big_tech.html (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review); Steve Kroft, The Data Brokers: Selling Your Personal Information, CBS (Mar. 9,
2014), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-data-brokers-selling-your-personal-information/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
148. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.14–1798.15 (placing strict regulations on the information that
government agencies may collect), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (requiring a business to simply
publish a privacy policy to its website).
149. Telephone Interview with Marc Levine, supra note 14.
150. See generally ECHR, supra note 55 (adding newly acknowledged human rights to the convention
on June 1, 2010), and ECFR, supra note 56 (acknowledging new fundamental rights to the charter on Oct. 26,
2012); Adler, supra note 22.
151. Compare 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (implementing non-commercial privacy regulations as of July 21,
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exploring privacy protections for its citizens. 152 The question of how to protect
Californians’ privacy was unresolved until Alastair Mactaggart, Rick Arney, and
Assemblymember Levine, broached the topic. 153
Section A juxtaposes the sluggish approach to privacy legislation in the
United States with the EU’s dynamic approach to fundamental rights. 154 Section
B explains why existing privacy laws will not protect Californians’ PII. 155
Section C explores how the California Legislature failed its constituents by
failing to legislate. 156 Section D details Big Tech’s excitement over AB 2182. 157
Section E chronicles how Chapter 55 transitioned from a ballot measure to a
law,158 and Section F discusses how citizens can use Chapter 55 as a model to
defeat powerful interest groups. 159
A. American Reluctance Versus European Proactivity
There is a stark contrast between the recent uptick in European cases pitting
the right to privacy against corporate interests and the absence of such cases in
the United States. 160 Although the concept of privacy is not new in the United
States,161 legislation protecting privacy from commercial entities has never
surfaced.162 In 1890, Harvard Law Review published an article titled “The Right
to Privacy,” in which Samuel Warren and Justice Brandeis concluded that
common law should grow “to meet the demands of society.”163 The article
asserted that the “development of the law was inevitable” as the legal community
identified new rights. 164 Nearly 130 years later, the issue of privacy was
unresolved in the United States, which raises the question: For a country founded
on protecting individual liberties, why did it taking so long to protect the right to

2011), with ECHR, supra note 55, at 3 (expanding recognized rights on June 1, 2010), and ECFR, supra note
56, at 391 (including new rights as of Oct. 26, 2012).
152. See AB 2182, supra note 76 (attempting to protect Californians’ privacy through regulations).
153. Adler, supra note 22.
154. Infra Part IV.A.
155. Infra Part IV.B.
156. Infra Part IV.C.
157. Infra Part IV.D.
158. Infra Part IV.E.
159. Infra Part IV.F.
160. See generally Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos, Mario Costeja González, 2014 E.C.R. I-317 (ruling in favor of an individual’s right to privacy on the
Internet), and Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. 5 (2015) (holding a business accountable for speech
posted on its website by an anonymous third party).
161. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193
(1890) (discussing the right to privacy in the year 1890).
162. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 6801 (regulating privacy with regard to the financial industry); CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 22580 (restricting marketing for businesses that advertise to minors).
163. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 161, at 193.
164. Id. at 193–95.
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privacy?165
Although the rights guaranteed in the ECHR and ECFR do not completely
mirror the freedoms that Americans enjoy, Europe takes human rights and
fundamental rights very seriously. 166 Neither the EU nor the Council of Europe
acknowledge every freedom from the Bill of Rights, but that is a testament to the
different values between the governing bodies. 167 The oldest rights guaranteed by
the ECHR and ECFR are less than 100 years old, and the respective governing
bodies updated both the ECHR and ECFR within the last ten years. 168 In fact, the
EU and the Council of Europe are continuously amending the ECHR and ECFR
to reflect values and protections required in a modern society.169
Why are American legislators hesitant to restrict the ways that businesses
abuse PII, let alone modernize the rights of Americans? 170 While Europe strives
to continually modernize its ECHR and ECFR, the United States government is
leaving Americans out in the cold. 171 Part of the reason politicians avoid attempts
to regulate privacy is because the tech lobby is too powerful. 172 Nevertheless,
legislators should steel their nerves on controversial topics like data breaches
because these issues impact millions of people, and Californians feel passionate
about consumer privacy. 173 The issue is whether legislators will produce common
sense regulations to protect their constituents. 174 If people are disenchanted with
the way that Big Tech sells consumer PII but legislators are failing to act, then
the tech lobby must be winning over the legislators.175

165. See generally U.S. CONST. amends. I–X (establishing the Bill of Rights that, without its existence,
the Constitutional Convention would not have ratified the Constitution); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (enacted
by Chapter 55) (creating the first privacy regulation impacting private industry since Warren and Brandeis
theorized the right to privacy in 1890).
166. See generally ECHR, supra note 55 (adding newly acknowledged human rights to the convention
on June 1, 2010), and ECFR, supra note 56 (acknowledging new fundamental rights to the charter on Oct. 26,
2012).
167. Compare generally U.S. CONST. amend. II (protecting the right to bear arms), with ECHR, supra
note 55 (remaining silent on the possession of firearms) and ECFR, supra note 56 (declining to address the
topic of firearms).
168. See ECHR, supra note 55, at 3 (adding new rights on June 1, 2010), and ECFR, supra note 56, at
391 (updating the listed rights on Oct. 26, 2012).
169. See generally ECHR, supra note 55 (including the right to privacy as a protected right), and ECFR,
supra note 56 (safeguarding an individual’s right to protect his or her data on the Internet).
170. See Telephone Interview with Marc Levine, supra note 14 (suggesting legislators do not want to
“take on the wealthiest, most profitable special interest in the world”).
171. See supra Part IV.A (juxtaposing European proactivity with American complacency as it applies to
modernizing rights).
172. See Telephone Interview with Marc Levine, supra note 14 (emphasizing the broad power and vast
wealth that Big Tech possesses).
173. See About Us, CAL. CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT, supra note 19 (discovering how angry and trapped
Californians feel regarding Internet privacy).
174. See Adler, supra note 22 (expressing skepticism whether lawmakers would be open to regulating
Internet privacy).
175. See About Us, CAL. CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT, supra note 19 (taking matters into his own hands
and proposing privacy regulations on a ballot measure).
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B. Why Existing Laws are Failing California Consumers
In Time, Inc. v. Hill,176 the Supreme Court noted that states are free to create
their own privacy laws. 177 California took advantage of this opportunity by
including the right to privacy in its constitution. 178 Now, California has three
main laws to regulate privacy, but none of these laws protect Californians from
commercial data abuse. 179 The first law applies to personal data that the
government possesses and is therefore irrelevant to consumer protection from
commercial abuses.180 The second law concerns California’s privacy policy
disclosure, but this law does nothing to protect consumers. 181 These first two
regulations impose no restrictions on what a business may do with PII, how long
it can retain PII, or whether a Californian can request that a business delete his or
her PII.182
California’s third privacy law created the OPP in 2010 and was a preliminary
step toward regulating data protection. 183 The state appeared to follow Warren
and Brandeis’ guidance from 1890 by requiring the OPP to recommend policies
to address consumer privacy. 184 Unfortunately, the government removed funding
from the OPP, and the agency ceased operations before the law could fulfill its
primary function. 185 In essence, the OPP still exists, yet it is completely
meaningless without funding and staff.186
When the OPP became defunct, its enforcement responsibilities shifted to the
OAG’s Privacy Enforcement and Protection Unit. 187 One of the main
responsibilities this unit absorbed was the enforcement of state and federal
privacy laws.188 In the absence of privacy regulations, the only real duties that
this unit has are to enforce the IPA and ensure that businesses are posting their
privacy policies online. 189 The Privacy Enforcement and Protection Unit is an
176. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
177. Id. at 415.
178. Compare generally id. (discussing the right to privacy in 1967), with J. Clark Kelso, California’s
Constitutional Right to Privacy, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 327, 328 (1992) (noting that California added “privacy” to its
Constitution in 1972).
179. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22580; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.14.
180. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.14.
181. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575.
182. Id.; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.14.
183. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 11549.5.
184. Id.
185. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY & CONSUMER PROTECTION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2182, at 2 (May 25, 2018); Governor Brown’s Budget Slashes State Spending by $12.5 Billion, OFF. OF
GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN JR., supra note 79.
186. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY & CONSUMER PROTECTION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2182, at 2 (May 25, 2018).
187. Id.
188. Id.; Privacy Enforcement and Protection, CAL. DEP’T. OF JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ (last
visited July 14, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
189. Compare Privacy Enforcement and Protection, CAL. DEP’T. OF JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/
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enforcement agency that has neither regulatory authority nor support from a
regulatory body. 190 This regulatory gap is precisely what Assemblymember
Levine hoped to close when he proposed AB 2182. 191
C. How the California Legislature Let Californians Down
Coincidentally, Assemblymember Levine proposed AB 2182 to do precisely
what Warren and Brandeis postulated in 1890; it would have created a regulatory
body to propose regulations matching modern innovation. 192 Like Warren and
Brandeis, Assemblymember Levine foresaw that modernizations generate the
need for legislation, that technological advancement impinges on the right to
privacy, and that legislation should develop alongside technology. 193
Assemblymember Levine’s proposed regulatory agency, the CDPA, would have
periodically recommended privacy regulations that would both account for
technological advancements and protect Californians’ privacy. 194 The CDPA’s
recommended regulations would have provided the Privacy Enforcement and
Protection Unit actual, meaningful authority because the unit would be enforcing
regulations that genuinely protect Californians’ privacy. 195
The Assembly held a legislative hearing for AB 2182 on April 17, 2018,
roughly one month before the Assembly removed the regulatory powers of the
bill.196 Mike Shapiro, Chief Privacy Officer for Santa Clara County, attended the
hearing for AB 2182 as the only witness present in support of the legislation. 197
In his testimony, he discussed an “uptick in data breaches,” namely from
Facebook, Cambridge Analytica, and Experian. 198 Mr. Shapiro explained that AB
2182 is a reasonable step toward data protection and that government must

(last visited July 14, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating that the Privacy
Enforcement and Privacy Unit enforces state and federal laws), with supra Part II.D (pointing to an absence of
state privacy laws), and supra Part II.D (explaining that federal privacy regulations do not apply to private
industry).
190. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY & CONSUMER PROTECTION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF
AB 2182, at 6 (Apr. 17, 2018) (explaining that the regulatory body—the OPP—disbanded and enforcement
responsibilities shifted to the OAG).
191. Telephone Interview with Marc Levine, supra note 14.
192. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY & CONSUMER PROTECTION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2182, at 3 (Apr. 17, 2018).
193. Id.
194. See Levine, supra note 14 (stating that the CDPA would have answered to the legislature for the
creation of regulations).
195. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY & CONSUMER PROTECTION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2182, at 1 (Apr. 17, 2018).
196. Compare id. at 8 (noting the date of the hearing as Apr. 17, 2018), with supra Part III.B (discussing
the California Assembly’s May 25, 2018 modifications).
197. Hearing on AB 2182 Before the Assembly Committee on Privacy & Consumer Prot., 2017 Leg.,
2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
198. Id.
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“balance business interests with the privacy interests of the public.” 199 He
charged government leaders with taking action and said that officials “cannot say
we understand, we know about these breaches, we have met, we have discussed
it, and yet we’ve decided to do nothing.” 200 After Mr. Shapiro finished speaking,
five witnesses representing various tech groups testified against AB 2182. 201 In
total, fourteen different business interest groups officially opposed AB 2182. 202
An enforcement agency should have support from a regulatory body, yet
both the California Assembly and Senate stripped AB 2182 of its ability to
generate regulations. 203 Influenced by the tech lobby, the Assembly and the
Senate rendered the law harmless. 204 In discussing privacy regulations,
Assemblymember Levine said, “You have a choice: you can do nothing, or you
can do something. Let’s advance the conversation.” 205 By removing regulatory
power from AB 2182, the California Legislature chose to do nothing. 206
D. Why AB 2182 Became a Win for Big Tech
Today, the OAG’s Privacy Enforcement and Protection Unit is responsible
for enforcing privacy regulations, but the lack of regulations leaves Californians
vulnerable to abuses by Big Tech.207 Initially, AB 2182 would have addressed
this vulnerability; however, the legislature modified the law and required the
OAG to publish a website containing links to privacy policies that businesses
already publish on their own websites. 208 Currently, the OAG maintains a similar
repository on its website which provides Californians with links to state and
federal regulations.209 It is evident that the OAG does not take its privacy
responsibilities seriously because, as of July 14, 2018, most of the links on its
website to federal privacy laws do not work. 210
Given the OAG’s nonchalant approach to its privacy enforcement
responsibilities, the gutted version of AB 2182 was a huge win for Big Tech. 211 If
the OAG cannot properly maintain the hyperlinks on one of its existing websites,
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY & CONSUMER PROTECTION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2182, at 8 (Apr. 17, 2018).
203. Telephone Interview with Marc Levine, supra note 14.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See id. (implying the failure to regulate is “doing nothing”).
207. Privacy Enforcement and Protection, supra note 188.
208. AB 2182, supra note 120.
209. Privacy Laws, CAL. DEP’T. OF JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/privacy-laws (last visited July 14,
2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
210. See id. (failing to update its links to federal privacy laws).
211. See Telephone Interview with Marc Levine, supra note 14 (discussing the changes to AB 2182 and
how it no longer applies to privacy).
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what evidence exists that its approach to this new repository would be any
different?212 AB 2182 reinforced the idea that, without actual regulations,
Californians must rely on the OAG’s website for information detailing how
businesses may sell their data.213 It is hard to see how California can protect its
citizens’ PII from commercial data abuses without implementing meaningful data
protection regulations. 214 Big Tech would have been free to continue its abuses of
consumer data given that the legislators failed to create a regulatory body
supported by a proactive enforcement agency. 215
E. The Story Behind Chapter 55
Inspired by a 2015 conversation with a Google engineer, Alastair Mactaggart
began researching the best way to enact privacy regulations. 216 The Google
engineer told Mactaggart, “If people just understood how much we knew about
them, they’d be really worried.” 217 This comment prompted Mactaggart, aided by
his friend Rick Arney, to embark on a two-year journey where the pair
researched Internet privacy, conducted focus groups, and drafted their ideal
privacy regulation. 218 Finally, they realized that the best route to enact change
would involve putting the matter in the hands of the people via a ballot
initiative.219
As Mactaggart’s plan unfolded, Big Tech caught wind of the potential
privacy regulations and began contributing money to oppose the initiative. 220
Initially, Facebook, Google, Comcast, AT&T, Verizon, Microsoft, and Uber had
contributed nearly 2 million dollars to a political action committee in opposition
to the measure. 221 Californians’ concerns over what businesses can do with their
PII won the day, and Mactaggart submitted his ballot initiative with 629,000
signatures.222
Two California legislators contacted McTaggart and asked if he would
212. See Privacy Laws, supra note 209 (anticipating the OAG will take a hands-off approach to its new
website much like it does with its current repository).
213. See supra Part III.C (explaining how the California Senate stripped AB 2182 of its regulatory
authority and rewrote the bill to create an Internet repository).
214. See supra Part IV.C (describing how the California Legislature actively avoided regulating Internet
privacy by killing AB 2182).
215. Compare GDPR, supra note 30, at 7 (implementing privacy protections), with ASSEMBLY
COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY & CONSUMER PROTECTION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2182, at 4 (Apr. 17, 2018)
(noting the amount of data breaches in California), and Privacy Laws, CAL. DEP’T. OF JUST.,
https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/privacy-laws (last visited July 14, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (containing non-operational links to federal privacy laws).
216. About Us, CAL. CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT, supra note 19.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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withdraw the ballot initiative if the “California Legislature passed a law”
addressing his concerns. 223 Skeptical, Mactaggart agreed on two conditions: first,
the law must replicate all of the measure’s critical components; second, the
legislature must pass the law before June 28, 2018. 224 Mactaggart found the
legislators’ first draft unacceptable because it gave the giant companies “a free
pass” by failing to require enforcement.225 Then, the day after the ballot measure
qualified for the November election, Chapter 55 passed its first committee. 226
Rumors swirled about the tech, automotive, and communications industries
mounting a 100-million-dollar opposition to the ballot measure in November. 227
The stage was set with public opinion favoring the ballot measure, the election
looming in November, and the California Legislature advancing a bill that
mirrored the ballot measure. 228 Once Chapter 55 satisfied his criteria, Mactaggart
offered the tech industry a choice: proceed with an expensive, unpopular
campaign in November, or accept Chapter 55. 229 The tech industry admitted
defeat, Mactaggart withdrew his ballot measure, and Governor Brown signed
Chapter 55 into law. 230
F. Chapter 55: A Model for Californians to Defeat Wealthy Lobbies
Big Tech is clearly thriving in today’s economy. 231 It built the perfect
business model: provide free services where users volunteer information that the
service provider monetizes. 232 On the most basic level, Big Tech created a system
of human capital where many people do not realize they are the product. 233 As
Mactaggart noted, “if you’re not paying for the product, you are the product.” 234
Big Tech is the “wealthiest, most powerful special interest in the world,” 235 and
every time a Facebook user adds information to his or her profile, the lobby
grows stronger and wealthier.236 Who will protect the people when lawmakers
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Sumagaysay, supra note 18.
227. About Us, CAL. CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT, supra note 19; Adler, supra note 22; Proposed Calif.
Ballot Measure Takes on Tech Companies, CBS NEWS, https://www.cbsnews.com/video/proposed-ballotmeasure-california-consumer-privacy-act-personal-information/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2018) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
228. About Us, CAL. CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT, supra note 19; Adler, supra note 22.
229. Adler, supra note 22.
230. About Us, CAL. CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT, supra note 19; Adler, supra note 22.
231. Telephone Interview with Marc Levine, supra note 14.
232. See id. (indicating that Big Tech’s model of selling personal information has made it the wealthiest
and most profitable special interest in the world).
233. Id.
234. About Us, CAL. CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT, supra note 19.
235. Telephone Interview with Marc Levine, supra note 14.
236. See Pring, supra note 145 (noting over 510,000 posts per minute); Telephone Interview with Marc
Levine, supra note 15 (implying Big Tech grows stronger and wealthier when data is added).
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refuse to regulate the richest special interest in the world? 237
Fortunately, as Mactaggart and Arney learned from the focus groups they
conducted, Californians have a deep-seated disdain for the “privacy bargain” that
Big Tech forces upon consumers. 238 Using Internet services is a take it-or-leave-it
scenario, where using the service means permitting the sale of your
information.239 Mactaggart and Arney leveraged Big Tech’s own product against
itself when the two discovered overwhelming support for their ballot measure. 240
Mactaggart’s approach to enacting change became novel when he decided to
enact legislation without the legislature. 241 As Mactaggart said, for the past
twenty-five years legislators have “been able to take up privacy,” but “[n]o one
ever has, because the big tech companies make sure it never gets anywhere.” 242
Instead of matching the complicity of the Legislature, Mactaggart leveraged the
public’s support for his ballot measure to force lawmakers to do their jobs. 243
Although there are lawmakers interested in regulating privacy like
Assemblymember Levine, the California Legislature demonstrated their
unwillingness to stand up to Big Tech by gutting AB 2182. 244 Mactaggart
revealed Californian’s concerns to the legislators, provided them with a model on
how to legislate privacy, gave them an ultimatum to enact change, and persisted
until Chapter 55 accomplished what he set out to do. 245 The story behind Chapter
55 illustrates the idea that, when the Legislature refuses to enact common-sense
legislation, Californians have a workaround via the ballot measure system. 246
V. CONCLUSION
There is an apparent disconnect between a person’s right to privacy, as
identified by the legal community, and the privacy regulations implemented by
the federal government. 247 Early on, Samuel Warren and Justice Brandeis pointed
237. See supra Part III.C (inferring that by refusing to enact privacy regulations the California
Legislature will not cross Big Tech).
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legislation once he figures out how to overcome the opposition), supra Part III.B (explaining how the Assembly
removed AB 2182’s regulatory powers), and supra Part III.C (describing how the Senate planned to give
control of AB 2182’s Internet repository to an agency that is already failing to maintain a website).
245. About Us, CAL. CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT, supra note 19.
246. See supra Part III.B (indicating that by stripping AB 2182 of its regulatory powers, the California
Assembly refused to stand up to Big Tech); About Us, CAL. CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT, supra note 19 (creating
regulations in an area that legislators refused to regulate).
247. Compare Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 415 (1967) (reaffirming that privacy is a right), Griswold
v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (citing the Constitution as justification for the right to privacy), and Mapp v.
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to a person’s right to privacy and indicated that the laws should evolve with
modern society.248 While the Internet was developing, between the late 1960s
through the early 2000s, the federal government passed legislation protecting
individuals’ privacy from abuses by essential services such as financial agencies,
credit reporting bureaus, and government entities. 249
The Internet has become essential in today’s society, and social media and
other services offered by Big Tech are becoming as pervasive as financial
institutions.250 With the frequency and size of data breaches rising, how does the
United States justify the continued monetization of Americans? 251 The big
question Californians face is how will the government protect its citizens’ PII? 252
If laws should evolve to meet the demands of society, then where are the laws
that regulate data collection, retention, and use by Big Tech? 253 The answer
provided by Mactaggart and Arney is that the Californians must rise up and
create the laws themselves when legislatures refuse to legislate. 254
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